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Abstract
Turbomachinery has increased in complexity and monitoring capabilities 
over the last several decades. This has resulted in an increased number of 
trips to protect various machinery systems. The prevailing OEM philosophy 
has been to protect the machine assuming that an immediate trip is safer 
and results in the lowest financial consequences. ExxonMobil and Siemens 
collaborated to redesign machinery protection and control systems with 
an “Operator’s mindset” – considering the integrated, full plant risk. The 
goal was to maximize safety and minimize integrated risk resulting in an 
increase in mean time between forced outage (MTBFO).
Business Case
Trips can increase safety exposure by 
putting demands on safety systems and 
personnel exposure during restarts
Downtime is often a key contributor to life 
cycle cost
*Data based on LNG service, 
2015 average LNG price and 
internal cost / downtime 
estimates.  
Gas turbine instrumentation, protective & 
control systems are the largest contributors 
to trips. 
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Shift in Mindset
Solution: Changed strategy to collaborate with OEMs to update OEM 
standard design - Sustainable solution rather than a one off design
• More trips do not necessarily improve safety. 
• More trips do not necessarily lower financial risk.
• Design one build many.
• Control systems are getting more complex, yet it is                              
harder to determine health of machine.
• According to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, incidents during plant 
start-up are 10 times more likely than during normal operations.*
*http://www.controleng.com/channels/process-control/process-control-news/single-article/the-role-of-simulator-technology-in-operator-training-programs/cb88591ddf.html
Drive to Collaborate
BEFORE
“Machine only Mindset”
Alarms & Trips geared 
primarily towards machine 
Protection.
“Operator Mindset”
Alarms & Trips to protect 
the facility – maximizing 
safety & minimizing 
integrated risk.
AFTERNew Risk Based 
Alarm & Trip 
Rationalization 
Methodology 
factoring in 
Operator Down 
Time
LEGEND:
ECS Engine Control System
PCS Package Control System
SIS Safety Instrumented System
ALM Alarm
CSD Controlled Shut Down
ESD Emergency Shutdown
Methodology
1. Develop Methodology 2. System Based Implementation
4. Coding & Roll-Out 3. Periodic Operator ReviewsOperator
• Risk Based Approach Focused on 
Understanding Protection Rationale
• Compares Risks with and Without 
Automatic Action to Tolerable Level
• Maximizing Uptime using System’s 
Physical/Synthesized Redundancy
• Empower Operator to Manage Risks of 
running in Degraded State 
• Calibrate Risk Assessment Against 
Operator’s assessment
• Alarm Management Tools (Response 
Procedure, Priorities, etc..)
• Coding & Validation of New 
Protections using Simulation Tools
• Roll-Out to Select Sites, Collection of 
Operational Data, and Feedback
Trip Rationale
• Do we need to trip? What is the failure we are trying to prevent trip?
• When do we arm/disarm trip?
• Is there an automatic action that can be done to prevent tripping? - Run back or 
trip to idle
• Is there another trip that prevents the same failure mode? Is it redundant?  
• Cross reference signals to eliminate/minimize spurious instrument failure trips?
• Eliminate/minimize Single Point of Failure (SPOF) trip devices
Trip Timers
• How long is it acceptable to continue operation before tripping? 
• Are there time delays/filters to eliminate/minimize instrument/processor 
“spikes” – example 3
OEM Process – Internal Q&A 
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Example 1
Abnormal Condition Failure 
Risk
Trip 
Risk
Mitigation New Trip
Risk
GT Lube Oil Supply 
Temperature Signal Fault High High
Use Tank Temperature for 
Redundancy if Sensor Fails Low
Oil Reservoir
Example 2
Abnormal Condition Failure 
Risk
Trip Risk Mitigation New Trip
Risk
LP Compressor Inlet 
Pressure Cross-Check Error Low Low
Remove Shutdown and 
Use Synthesized Value Low
LP IP HP
Sig2
Sig1
Fault LP Inlet P 
(Before) =
LP Inlet P (After) =
No Signal Faults AVG(Sig1,Sig2) AVG(Sig1,Sig2)
Single Signal Fault Remaining 
Healthy Sig
Remaining Healthy Sig
Cross-Check Error Shutdown Use Synthesized Site 
Ambient P to Arbitrate
2oo2 Signal Faults Shutdown Synthesized from Site 
Ambient P
Example 3
Improved Signal Validation on All Instrumentation (e.g. IP Compressor 
Inlet Pressure)
Condition Before After
Signal Fault Trigger Instantaneous Signal
Kick Out
Confirmation Delay of X secs
Freeze Last Good Value in Mean Time
Signal Reinstate Can Only Reinstate 
After Engine Shutdown
Automatic Signal Reinstate if:
1- Signal Returns to Normal X sec/mins 
within Fault 
2- Signal Experiences “Y” mins of Good 
Behavior  during the reinstate window
• Exercise Conducted on SGT-A65 Gas Turbine Control System
• New Software Tested & Implemented at Several Sites
• Solution is Now the New Standard for Siemens
Results
Alarm & Trip ChangesSingle Point Of Failure ReductionAlarm Prioritization
Conclusions
• Operators and OEM collaboration resulted in a new standard solution for 
the OEM.
• 20-25% expected increase in run time between forced outages
• Prioritized alarm list following industry standard – ISA 18.2 
• Benefits customers for new units
• Scope expanding from SGT-A65 TR to other unit types
• Software changes can be incorporated into existing equipment
• Sustainable solution - OEMs continue to learn and improve with fleet 
data by addressing repetitive trips
• Benefits the industry if more operators collaborate with OEMs to improve 
OEM standard design.
